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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). This case is an appeal 
from the District Court and has been transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. When money is paid by a Plaintiff to a third party on 
behalf of, and at the request of the Defendant, but there is no 
written or oral agreement that the transaction is a loan, and 
there is evidence that the Plaintiff and his associates owe De-
fendant money, does the law imply a duty to repay? 
2. Does the Statute of Frauds preclude introduction at 
trial of evidence of the circumstances and relationship between 
the parties in an action to recover monies paid to a third person 
by Plaintiff on behalf of Defendant? 
3. Were the Trial Court's Findings Numbers 3 and 4 and the 
Judgment supported by the evidence? 
4. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in its deter-
minations at trial? 
5. Is the awarding of costs and fees to the De-
fendant/Respondent appropriate in this case? 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4(2): 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, 
or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in 
writing signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement: 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another; 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 40(b) 
Assignment of Cases for Trial Continuance 
Order and Precedence, 
Postponement of the Trial. 
Taking Testimony of Witnesses Present. 
(b) Postponement of the Trial 
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its 
discretion, and upon such terms as may be just# 
including the payment of costs occasioned by such 
postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon 
good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the 
ground of the absence of evidence, such motion 
shall also set forth the materiality of the evi-
dence expected to be obtained and shall show that 
due diligence has been used to procure it. The 
court may also require the party seeking the 
continuance to state, upon affidavit or under 
oath the evidence he expects to obtain, and if the 
adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence 
would be given, and that it may be considered as 
actually given on the trial, or offered and ex-
cluded as improper, the trial shall not be post-
poned upon that ground. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions or Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any 
of the following causes; provided, however, that 
on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if 
one has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or 
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the 
entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of 
the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discre-
tion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision, 
Rule 40. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
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or that it is against the law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for new trial shall be 
served not later than 10 days after the entry of 
the judgment. 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals Rule 33(a) 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of 
attorney fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the 
Court determines that a motion made or an appear 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or 
for delay, it shall award just damages and 
single or double costs, including reasonable 
attorney fees, to the prevailing party. 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals Rule 40(a) 
Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and 
discipline. 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every 
motion, brief, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at 
least one attorney of record who is an active 
member in good standing of the bar of the Supreme 
Court of Utah. The attorney shall sign his or her 
individual name and give his or her business 
address. A party who is not represented by an 
attorney shall sign every motion, brief, and other 
paper and state the party's address. Except when 
otherwise specifically provided by rule or stat-
ute, motions briefs, or other papers need not be 
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signa-
ture of an attorney or a party constitutes a 
certificate that the attorney or the party has 
read the motion, brief or other paper; that to 
the best of the attorney's or the party's knowl-
edge, information, and belief, formed after rea-
sonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law; and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purposes, such as to 
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harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a motion, 
brief, or other paper is not signed as required by 
this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is 
signed promptly after the omission is called to 
the attention of the attorney or the party. If a 
motion, brief, or other paper is signed in viola-
tion of this rule, the court, upon motion or sua 
sponte, shall impose upon the person who signed 
it, a represented party, or both an appropriate 
sanction, which may include dismissal or affirm-
ance of the appear, sanctions and discipline under 
Paragraph (b) of this rule, or an order to pay to 
the other party or parties this amount of the 
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing 
of the motion, brief, or other paper, including a 
reasonable attorney fee. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jerry Spicer sued Michael Hughes to collect the sum of 
Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-One dollars and Eighty Cents 
($11,221.80) alleging that he had "loaned" Mr. Hughes that 
amount, that Spicer had demanded repayment of the "loan", and 
that Hughes refused to repay. Defendant Answered Plaintiff's 
Complaint, denying the allegations, claiming no loan was made, 
and no obligation of repayment existed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A bench trial was held on September 20, 1988 before Third 
Judicial District Court Judge Scott Daniels. Immediately before 
trial, Plaintiff moved to continue the action as the Plaintiff 
failed to appear, which motion was denied. Plaintiff's motion to 
allow the testimony of Mr. Spicer to be taken sometime in the 
future was taken under advisement, and later denied. Judge 
Daniels heard Plaintiff's case, and awarded judgment in favor of 
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Defendant dismissing the action. A notice of appeal was filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Trial was originally set in this matter for Thursday, July 
14, 1988, at 9:00 a.m. Upon motion by the Plaintiff, a continu-
ance was granted until Tuesday, September 20, 1988 (TR:2). On 
the date and time set for trial, Plaintiff's counsel again moved 
the Court to continue the trial, alleging that Mr. Spicer was in 
Florida (TR:5) with an ear infection (TR:2) which prevented him 
from flying to attend the trial (TR:2). Defendant objected to 
another continuance (TR:3). The Court denied Plaintiff's Motion 
(TR:5). 
Plaintiff next moved the Court to allow Mr. Spicer to 
present testimony at some future date. Plaintiff's motion was 
taken under advisement (TR:5). 
Mr. Spicer alleged in his Complaint that he had "loaned" Mr 
Hughes a sum certain (Plaintiff's Complaint paragraph 4). Inas-
much as Mr. Spicer did not attend the trial, and counsel elected 
to proceed, Mr. Hughes was the only witness to testify. Mr. 
Hughes testified that at the time of the transaction giving rise 
to this action, that he was employed as a stockbroker (TR:10), 
and had a series of dealings with Mr. Spicer (TR:44-45). Mr. 
Hughes had a financial problem in Texas, the resolution of which 
required the payment of eleven thousand Dollars to a third per-
son. (TR:10). Hughes was owed money by Mr. Spicer (TR:46). A 
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corporate entity in which Mr. Spicer was involved called U.S.S.& 
T. owed Mr. Hughes money (TR:48). Mr. Hughes telephoned Mr. 
Spicer at U.S.S.& T.'s offices in Dallas Texas, and directed that 
Mr. Spicer pay the third party $11,000 (TR:22-23). Mr. Spicer 
paid $11,000 to the third person (TR:16, 24). No mention of a 
loan to Mr. Hughes was ever made by Spicer (TR:16,42). Mr. 
Hughes never considered the funds transferred to the third person 
to be a loan (TR:16, 41, 43). 
Some twelve (12) months passed without any attempt by Mr. 
Spicer to seek repayment of the $11,000 from Mr. Hughes (TR:42). 
After hearing and weighing the credibility of the witness, 
examining the admitted exhibits, and considering the arguments of 
counsel, the Court ruled in favor of Defendant. The Court denied 
Plaintiff's Motion to hold the trial open until it was more 
convenient for Mr. Spicer to testify. (TR:49). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The bald payment of money from the Plaintiff to another for 
the benefit of the Defendant, does not, as a matter of law, imply 
a duty on the part of Defendant to repay, even if payment was 
made at the direction or request of the Defendant. 
The introduction and consideration of evidence at trial of 
the circumstances surrounding the subject transaction was not 
barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
The Findings of Fact were logically founded upon the evi-
dence at trial, and were not clearly erroneous, and should not be 
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disturbed. 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the Court to deny 
Plaintiff's motion to allow the case to remain open to a later 
date to permit testimony of Mr. Spicer. 
Because of the relative merits of the parties' positions in 
this matter, and because of the nature of the issues raised by 
Appellant on appeal, the Plaintiff should be ordered by this 
Court, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals to pay Defendant's costs and attorney fees incurred 
through the defense of this action. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
MR. HUGHES HAS NO DUTY TO REPAY MR. SPICER. 
In Plaintiff's Complaint, Spicer alleges the existence of a 
loan in the amount of $11,221.80, to be repaid in ten (10) days. 
The burden is on the Plaintiff to prove the elements of his 
case. The Plaintiff here is unable to do so. At trial, Plain-
tiff urged the Court to find that the Defendant had an implied 
duty at law to repay monies paid on his behalf to third persons. 
The Court gave leave to Counsel to brief and present to the Court 
legal argument in support of his proposition. The Court received 
plaintiff's "post-trial memorandum" which propounds in substance 
the argument contained in Point I of Appellant's Brief. Plain-
tiff now urges this Court to reverse the Judgment of the District 
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Court and to enter Judgment of Plaintiff as prayed for in the 
Complaint. Counsel for the Plaintiff relies on his interpreta-
tion of the Common Law rules of assumpsit in support of his 
position, citing five cases. Each of these cases can be distin-
guished and are of limited precedential value. 
Island Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 57 
F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1932) Cert. den. 287 U.S. 646 (1933) is factu-
ally dissimilar. There the Plaintiff was attempting to receive a 
certain tax benefit after it had thrown good money after bad. 
The facts disclosed that the lender had continued to advance 
money to borrowers for the development of oil properties, even 
after the venture proved worthless. The finding of the tax board 
was that "the amounts paid out by the petitioner to or for the 
Texas corporations were merely advances or loans by the petition-
er." id,, at 994. The Court held that the advances made were 
loans which the Texas corporations would repay if the business 
venture was successful. Here there was no finding that this 
transaction was a loan. 
In Kennedy v. Conrad, 9 Mont. 356, 9 P.2d 1075, (1932), the 
defendants were owners of an oil and gas lease on property on 
which they were obligated to drill an oil well. Plaintiffs 
acquired an overriding royalty interest in the proceeds. After 
commercial quantities of petroleum was found, "the well required 
cleaning to prevent it from becoming valueless through caving, 
and to prevent defendants' rights from being forfeited for non-
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production of oil and gas in commercial quantities; that, for the 
protection of the said lease and plaintiffs' interests therein, 
it was necessary that someone should furnish the money for the 
cleaning out and swabbing... that the defendants were unable to 
pay for the same or to perform the said labor, and that at the 
instance and the request of the defendants...the plaintiffs 
advanced to defendants for the use and benefit of all of them 
(certain amounts at certain times and under certain 
conditions)... and that in equity and good conscience the defend-
ants should repay the said amount to the plaintiffs." Kennedy at 
1076. The Court held "Since the parties made an agreement with 
respect to the emergency confronting them, and since the advance-
ments were made pursuant to the agreement, plaintiffs, if they 
insisted upon the right of indemnity from defendants, should have 
made provision to that effect as a part of the agreement. The 
circumstances under which plaintiffs paid the money negative any 
expectation of its return from defendants...." id at 1079. The 
Court here found no agreement between the parties, after consid-
ering, as did the Court in Kennedy, the circumstances surrounding 
the transaction. 
In Sommer v. Nakdimen, 97 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1938), an 
Arkansas Court was asked to enforce a stale negotiable note where 
the defendant had for many years promised in writing to repay. 
The defendant raised the Arkansas Statute of Frauds and Statute 
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of Limitations, The Court held that the claim, since founded on 
an implied contract, was be barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
Sommer at 722. 
In Minsky's Follies of Florida v. Sennes, 206 F.2d 1 (5th 
Cir. 1953), the Florida trial Court was asked to enforce an oral 
lease agreement of over one year evidenced by a series of tele-
grams and letters. The defendant raised the Florida statute of 
frauds as a defense. The Court held that the lease was unen-
forceable and barred by the statute of frauds. But because of 
the attending circumstances, the Court did find that certain 
expenditures made by the plaintiff for the benefit of defendant 
did not flow from the breach of the lease itself, and were there-
fore recoverable. The Trial Court here likewise considered the 
context in which this transaction occurred, and held that the 
Defendant did not owe the Plaintiff. 
In Roussel v. Russell, 339 P.2d 522 (Okla. 1959), the Court 
interpreted an oral agreement, under which the defendant was to 
pay the plaintiff his costs expended in obtaining for the defend-
ant certain oil and gas leases. The defendant attempted unsuc-
cessfully to have the contract deemed unenforceable as violative 
of the Oklahoma statute of frauds. 
"It therefore appears us not to be 
within the Statute of Frauds, but, on 
the contrary, to be within the class of 
cases where, after the contract directly 
concerning the interest in land has been 
executed, the action has been held to 
lie upon a separate promise to be per-
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formed after such execution. 
Whether the present action be 
regarded as founded on an express prom-
ise, or an implied one, or whether 
defendant's final promise to pay for the 
plaintiff had obtained, related back to, 
and was connected with, his original 
request for leases on the interest of 
all of the Quiqley heirs, or whether it 
be regarded as founded on quasi, or 
constructive, contract, we think that 
instead of being an action to charge a 
defendant on a contract to convey an 
interest in real estate—and within the 
Statute of Frauds—it is solely for the 
recovery of money paid, lent, or ad-
vanced, and is in the nature of assump-
sit, in which actions for 'money had or 
received had their origin." Roussel at 
527. 
Again, the Court found an agreement to repay, and because of 
the surrounding circumstances of the transactions, enforced that 
agreement. Here, there was no agreement for the Court to en-
force, and the Court found no other basis to award Judgment for 
the Plaintiff. 
Assumpsit has been discussed by Utah Courts relatively 
infrequently. In Beecher v. Salt Lake City, 531 P.2d 1300, (Utah 
1975), the Court disallowed an architect's claim of an additional 
$130,000 in fees for alleged extra work. In Build v. Italasano, 
398 P.2d 544, (Utah 1965), the Court would not disturb the Trial 
Court's findings that although there was not an enforceable 
contract, that in order to "effectuate substantial justice in 
equity,... that from the evidence, on a quasi-contractual basis, 
Build was entitled to judgment...." Build at 544. "The trial 
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court, finding no express or enforceable contract, did find that 
there was a quasi-contractual relationship which is law, rather 
than an equity, action, (footnote omitted) It thereupon assessed 
the value of the benefits conferred upon the Italasanos by Build 
and entered judgment accordingly, (footnote omitted) In review-
ing the record, we cannot say that the lower court's findings and 
judgment, viewed in the light most favorable to them, were un-
sound or unreasonable." id at 545. Here, the findings of the 
Court were contrary, but similarly are well founded in the evi-
dence and should not be disturbed. 
And, in Manwill v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177 (Utah 1961), although 
assumpsit is not discussed specifically, the factual setting is 
somewhat analogous to the instant case. There, the plaintiff 
sued to recover the amount of payments he had made on defendants' 
behalf. Plaintiff alleged that during the years 1950, 1951, 
1952, and 1953 he had made payments on defendants' behalf on a 
farm occupied by the defendants, and that in 1954 had transferred 
a valuable grazing permit and eighteen head of cattle to them. 
Plaintiff further alleged that in July or August, 1956, defend-
ants orally agreed to repay plaintiff. Manwill at 177. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that since the plaintiff could not allege 
facts sufficient to make the alleged oral promise of 1957 a 
binding contract, inasmuch as a mere moral obligation is not 
valid consideration, it was error to deny the defendants' motion 
to dismiss, id at 179. 
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Appellant fails in his Brief to cite to any Utah authority 
to support his position that the common law rules of assumpsit 
are viable in this jurisdiction, and if they are, why Mr. Hughes 
has an implied duty at law to repay Mr. Spicer. Even if the 
rules of assumpsit as propounded by Plaintiff are applicable to 
this case, the Court did not find any legal or equitable reason 
given the particular facts of this case to award Judgment to the 
Plaintiff. 
Point II. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4 (2) as part of the Utah 
Statute of Frauds provides "The following agreements are void 
unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of the agree-
ment, is in writing signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement . . . . (2) every promise to answer for the debt, 
default or miscarriage of another; (emphasis added). Here, the 
Court was not faced with a promise to repay. Mr. Hughes never 
promised to repay Mr. Spicer. Mr. Hughes testified that Mr. 
Spicer owed Hughes money. Mr. Hughes also testified that others 
associated with Mr. Spicer owed Hughes money. Mr. Spicer actual-
ly paid monies to third persons for the benefit of Mr. Hughes. 
Plaintiff alleges that in order to enforce the "contract" between 
Spicer and Hughes for Spicer to answer for the debt of a third 
party that it must be in writing. But Mr. Hughes is not attempt-
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ing in this action to collect from Mr. Spicer. Spicer already 
repaid a portion of the money owed to Hughes and is now attempt-
ing to reverse that transaction by raising the Statute of Frauds 
as a "defense" even though he is the Plaintiff. The evidence 
adduced at trial while possibly irrelevant to the issue of wheth-
er third party associates of Mr. Spicer owed Mr. Hughes, was 
nonetheless relevant to the issue of the existence of a "loan" 
from Spicer to Hughes as alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint. The 
Court heard competent testimony relative to the course of deal-
ings between the parties in its determination of the context of 
the payment of the $11,000 by Mr. Spicer to the third person on 
Mr. Hughes' behalf. The evidence was not barred by the Statute 
of Frauds, and was properly admitted and considered by the Court. 
Point III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS NUMBERS 3 AND 4 AND THE JUDGMENT 
ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 (a) governs the method by 
which a dissatisfied party may have a case reopened. The Plain-
tiff here did not comply with the Rule. 
The standard by which this Court must examine the findings 
of the lower Court is one of "clearly erroneous". "We give 
great deference to the trial courts' findings of fact and do not 
overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous." In re Estate 
of Bartrell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). That finding (of 
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fact) is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and on appeal, 
the evidence is surveyed in the light most favorable to the 
finding." College Irrigation Company v. Logan River and Black-
smith Fork Irrigation Co.. 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989) (citing 
Harline v. Campbell. 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986)). "If there 
is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support the finding, the 
finding will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. 
College Irrigation at 1244. Further, "it is incumbent upon appel-
lants to marshal all of the evidence in support of the findings 
of the trial court and to then demonstrate that even when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the factual determination of the 
trial court, the evidence is insufficient to support its find-
ings." (citing Harline. supra at 982.) "Failure of appellants to 
do so in the instant case is, in and of itself, dispositive of 
their challenge to the trial court's findings of fact." College 
Irrigation, supra at 1244, (citing Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp.. 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Findings Numbers 3 and 4 by Judge 
Daniels are not clearly erroneous, and therefore must be upheld. 
The evidence at trial showed that Mr. Spicer owed Hughes 
money. Citram Corp., of which Mr. Spicer was an officer owed 
Hughes money. U.S.S.& T., of which Mr. Spicer was an officer, 
owed Hughes money. In the absence of any evidence to the con-
trary, the Trial Court did not err in its Findings relative to 
these issues. 
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The Conclusions of Law reached by the Court flowed naturally 
and directly from the evidence, and were not based exclusively on 
Findings Numbers 3 and 4 as alleged in Plaintiff's Brief, but 
were determined by the totality of the factual evidence presented 
at trial. Even if arguendo Findings #3 and #4 were totally 
erroneous, and not at all supported by the evidence, the legal 
conclusions still stand on their own merits, and should not be 
disturbed. There simply was not an agreement between Spicer and 
Hughes that Hughes would repay the money paid by Spicer to the 
third party at the direction of Hughes. There is no evidence 
that this was a "loan". Mr. Hughes testified specifically that 
this transaction was not a loan. And given the test as outlined 
above from College Irrigation, the Plaintiff clearly has not met 
his burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness, which is 
dispositive on this issue. 
Because the testimony of the witness and the evidence intro-
duced at trial substantiate the Findings, they cannot be found to 
be clearly erroneous, and as such must be upheld. 
Point IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ITS RULINGS AT TRIAL. 
Trial Courts are afforded wide latitude respecting the 
conduct of trial. Here, Judge Daniels did not err in denying 
Plaintiff's motion to continue or to hold the trial open. This 
matter had already been continued once at the instance of Plain-
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tiff. The motion to continue was not timely filed, but was made 
orally at the time set for trial. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
40 governs the circumstances by which a postponement could occur. 
Mr. Spicer as the Plaintiff had the affirmative obligation to 
attend the trial if he wished to testify and present evidence. 
Counsel for Plaintiff presented no evidence other than bald 
assertions as to the unavailability of the Plaintiff. Even if 
Mr. Spicer was in fact medically precluded from flying to the 
trial, there exist alternate methods of transportation. Further, 
Plaintiff was not left without a remedy even facing the posture 
in which he was voluntarily placed, as counsel could have dis-
missed the action without prejudice, and refiled. Instead, 
counsel stated on the record that he was prepared to proceed 
(TR:3, 4, and 6), and in fact put on his case in chief. Given 
this scenario, the Court did not err in refusing Plaintiff's 
motions. 
Point V. 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY DEFENDANT'S COSTS INCURRED 
IN DEFENSE OF THIS ACTION. 
Plaintiff should be ordered to pay costs of this Appeal. 
This Court is afforded wide latitude in the apportionment of 
costs of appeal, (see: Riche v. Riche, P.2d ,(Utah App. 
1989), Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas, P.2d 
(Utah App. 1989), Maughan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 
20 
1989)). 
Rules of Utah Court of Appeals 33(a) governs this issue. 
Rule 33(a) states that attorney fees nay be awarded when "the 
motion made on an appeal taken under these rules is either frivo-
lous or for delay.... In Cody v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 
(Utah 1983), the Supreme Court equated frivolous with being 
without merit. "A frivolous appeal is one without merit." O'Bri-
en v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987). "For purposes of 
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals we define a 
"frivolous appeal" as one having no reasonable legal or factual 
basis as defined in Rule 40 (a)." "Since a party has already 
been to court once and had the benefit of one ruling, the deci-
sion to appeal should be rendered only after careful considera-
tion by the party and counsel." "Defendant's claim on appeal 
simply controvert the findings of the court. The claims are not 
only without merit but are also without basis in law or fact." 
O'Brien supra at 310. 
Taken in its most simple terms, this case is one where 
Plaintiff owed Defendant money, repaid a portion of it, and then 
sued to recover what had been repaid. It should not be over-
looked that there was never an agreement by Hughes to pay Spicer, 
or that over a year went by before Spicer made a "demand" on 
Hughes for repayment, or that any delay in bringing this matter 
to trial was brought on by the Plaintiff. Mr. Hughes was com-
pelled to defend himself against the action of Mr. Spicer in the 
21 
trial court, and now, after Mr. Spicer has "had his day in Court" 
is placed in the posture of once again incurring legal fees and 
costs in this appeal. Given the relative merits of the parties' 
positions in this matter, and given the authority as articulated 
above, Defendant urges this Court to assess costs and expenses of 
the Defendant to the Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the above-stated reasons, Respondent hereby 
respectfully requests that the appeal taken by Jerry Spicer be 
denied, and that Respondent be awarded his reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of January, 1990. 
fe/^ 
Michael H. Wray 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondent 
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ADDENDUM TO 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Edward T. Wells - Bar No. 3422 
BOTTUM & WELLS, P.C. 
323 South 600 East - Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 538-0700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY SPICER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MICHAEL S. HUGHES, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C H - O ^ l ^ 
For cause of action against defendant, plaintiff alleges as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Florida. 
2. Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
3. The actions complained of occurred in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
4. On or about October 15, 1986, plaintiff loaned to 
defendant the sum of Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-One Dollars 
and Eighty Cents ($11,221.80) which sum defendant agreed to repay 
in ten (10) days. 
5. Defendant has refused to pay back the money loaned. 
6. Defendant is endebted to plaintiff in the sum of Eleven 
Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-One Dollars and Eighty Cents 
$11,221.80) plus interest at the statutory rate to date of judgment 
which sums defendant has refused to pay. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against defendant in the 
sum of Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-One Dollars and Eighty 
Cents ($11,221.80) plus interest as allowed by law plus all costs 
incurred in this action. 
DATED t h i s / < ~ / ^ d a y of November, 1987 . 
BOTTUM & WELLS., P.C. 
Edward T. Wells ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
(2) 
William L. Schultz #3626 
Attorney at Law 
1061 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 487-3222 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY SPICER, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MICHAEL S. HUGHES ] 
Defendant. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
> Civil No. C87-07595 
COMES NOW Defendant, Michael S. Hughes, and answers 
Plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action 
on which relief can be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
2. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to answer the 
allegations of paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint, and 
therefore denies the same* 
3# Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 2 and 3 
of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
4. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 4, 5 and 
6 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
5. Defendant denies each and every allegation of 
Plaintiff's Complaint not specifically admitted. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
6. Plaintifffs claims are barred by the State of Frauds and 
the Uniform Commercial Code* 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
7. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Statute of 
Limitations and the Doctrine of Laches. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
8. Defendant's obligations to Plaintiff have been satisfied 
and discharged in full. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
9. Plaintiff's transfer of moneis to Defendant was not a 
loan, and there is no obligation for repayment. 
Wherefore, having fully answered Plaintiff's Complaint, 
Defendant prays that Plaintiff take nothing thereby and that it 
be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this j ^ day of lj&4***v6+\ , 1987. 
V 
fILLIAM L. SCHULTZ / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Answer was deposited, postage prepaid, in the U.S. Mail 
to the below named on this / V day of /J^t^Or^^^, , 1987. 
Edward T. Wells, Esq. 
Bottum & Wells, P.C. 
323 South 600 East, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 H41U2 S 
V ,T,
 t -+ 
Edward T. Wells - 3422 
J. H. BOTTOM & ASSOCIATES 
323 South 600 East, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 538-0700 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY SPICER, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
MICHAEL S. HUGHES, ' 
Defendant. 
I POST TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
i HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
COMES NOW the plaintiff herein, pursuant to the request 
of the Court at the time of argument of the above cause, and 
submits the following Memorandum to support the proposition that 
there is an implied duty at law to repay monies paid to a third 
party at the request of defendant, 
ISSUE 
At trial, the evidence clearly showed, and defendant 
admitted, that he requested Mr. Spicer to make a payment on his 
behalf to an attorney in Texas to solve a rescission problem he had 
on a stock sale. Exhibits 11, 12, 13 and 14 show that the money 
was in fact paid as requested by the defendant. 
The issue on which the Court requested authority was: 
"Whether there is an implied duty at law to repay to the 
plaintiff monies which he has paid out at the specific 
request of the defendant.11 
ARGUMENT 
At common law, one could bring an action in assumpsit for 
money paid. The action was one for money paid by one to a third 
party for the benefit of another. See 58 C.J.S. Money Paid Sec. 
1. As a general rule, if a person pays money to a third party for 
the use or benefit of another at such other's express or implied 
request, he can recover the money so paid from such other. Id at 
Sec. 4. In fact "Where one pays out money at the special instance 
and request of another, the law implies a promise on the part of 
the latter to repay it." Id at 894. 
The aforesaid rule appears to be universally followed. 
See e.g. Minskv's Follies of Florida v. Sennesr 206 F.2d 1,4 (5th 
Cir. 1953); Sommer v. Nakdimen, 97 F.2d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 1938); 
Island Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 57 F.2d 
992 (4th Cir. 1932) cert. den. 287 U.S. 646 (1933); Roussel v. 
Russel, 339 P.2d 522, 527 (Okla. 1959); Kennedysvi Conrad. 9 P.2d 
1075, 1078, 91 Mont. 356 (1932). 
In the Roussel case, Supra, the Oklahoma Court, citing 
Kennedy v. Conrad, Supra., stated: 
The rule is that where one pays out money at the 
special instance and request of another, the law implies 
a promise on the part of the latter to repay rtr.r 339 
P.2d at 527. 
In Kennedy v. Conrad, Supra, the Court held: 
...[I]t was not necessary to sustain plaintiff's right 
of recovery that there be an express promise on the part 
of defendants to repay the value of the casing; for the 
rule is that, "Where one pays out money at the special 
instance and request of another, the law implies a 
promise on the part of the latter to repay it." 9 P.2d 
at 1078 (Citations omitted). 
2 
CONCLUSION 
Thus in t l i I ' r 'pnrnt <\v,f' .. uU' i , *j . idducud 1; i om 
defendant'.1. .lulli pi u i i i t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r t h e monies p a i d 
on b e h a l f of d e f e n d a n t a t h i s e x p r e s s r e q u e s t a s p r a y e d fn i i 
c o m p l a i n t , n i n c o a l l «: I ,:i i IW.MI offsefrs i" hj,i en I j n t a r e . b a r r e d Jay t h e 
:-jl ca Li.il e i.i i 1. r a u d u . 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of Septerrf 
Edward T. Wells 
Attornev -For p] -
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the day of September 
mailed m mrr- nf the above tffMo^ijjv i „ m ir>i*l rn M • prci 
States ma J i , i • 
Michael H. Wr a/y 
1061 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 
Secretary 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY SPICER, 
v s . 
MICHAEL 
A P 
For 
For 
P E 
t h e 
t h e 
P l a i n t i f f , ) 
S. HUGHES, 
) C i v i l No. 
Defendant . ) 
BEFORE 
A R A N C E 
P l a i n t i f f 
Defendant: 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
September 2 0 , 1988 
9:00 a.m. 
C-87- ' 
THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
_S: 
7595 
Edward T. W e l l s 
J . H. Bottum & A s s o c i a t e s 
323 South 600 E a s t , S u i t e 150 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102 
Michael Wray 
At torney a t Law 
1061 Eas t 2100 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
GAYLE B. CAMPBELL 
Registered Professional Reporter 
240 East 4th South - A304 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
84106 
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1 Salt Lake City, Utah September 20, 1988 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 (Following proceedings held in chambers at 
4 9 o'clock a.m.) 
5 THE COURT: This is Spicer vs. Hughes, 
g C87-7595. The record will show that the attorneys are 
7 present here in chambers. 
8 I Do we have anything to cover before we start 
9 the trial. 
MR. WELLS: Yes, Your Honor. As Your 
Ij I Honor is aware, I called yesterday afternoon and tried 
12 to reach Mr. Wray's office, and did speak with a 
jg gentleman there, who indicated that he would attempt 
14 to reach Mr. Wray and have him call me. 
jj I did not hear from him and was unable to reach 
lg him through the afternoon until a little after 5 o'clock. 
17 I tried to call the court, and the court of 
18 course called me and we had a discussion at the time 
19 regarding my request for a continuance. I'd had a phone 
20 call from Mr. Spicer, who, as the court is aware, has 
2i been suffering from an inner ear infection, and the doctor 
22 has advised him not to fly when that is bothering him. 
23 Now, the trial was continued the last time 
24 because of that problem, and I was going to ask for a 
25 J continuance. Since we couldn't reach Mr. Wray and he 
2 
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I! 
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is here prepared to go to trial, I would like to make 
a motion in the alternative: First of all that the court 
grant a continuance, and in the event that that continuance 
is not granted, that the court then go ahead and allow 
me to put my case on through the defendant, which I think 
I can do. 
And then in the event there is a need for rebuttal 
testimony, that the court hold the case open to allow 
us to either get a trial deposition from Mr. SpicBr, 
in the event the doctor doesn't feel he will be able 
to travel within, you know, a reasonable period of time, 
or in the alternative that we hold the matter open and 
allow him to come in and get his testimony at a later 
date. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Wray. 
MR. WRAY: I would strenuously oppose 
the motion of counsel. I don't know if I need to address 
my whereabouts yesterday. However, I will indicate for 
the court's information that I was preparing for this 
trial. As of Thursday of last week, the last time that 
Mr. Wells and I had communication about this matter, 
it was Mr. Wells' indication to me that Mr. Spicer was 
going to be here on Tuesday and we were going to trial. 
Now, there are alternate means of transportation for 
Mr. Spicer from wherever he is to here this morning. 
3 
10 
11 
j He has known about the trial. I am prepared for trial* 
2 I think it's appropriate that the witness — and the 
3 plaintiff especially be here in court this morning for 
4 the trial. I think a continuance in this matter is not 
5 appropriate. 
5 As far as the second motion by Mr. Wells, I'm 
7 not certain of the mechanics of what he is proposing. 
3 Many of the documents that we have marked as exhibits 
9 for the defendant, the foundational requirements are 
unlikely to be fulfilled without the presence of Mr. 
Spicer. 
.- I would move for a dismissal with prejudice 
13 
14 
15 
16 
in this case, Your Honor, if Mr. Wells is not prepared 
to go to trial. 
MR. WELLS: I'm prepared to go if the 
court so rules. I'm just asking that in the event there 
17 I is a need for rebuttal testimony from Mr. Spicer, that 
13 we be allowed an opportunity to — because of his problem, 
too, as 1 said, either get it by way of deposition or 
have him come out. He is scheduled to be here, I believe, 
the second week of October for a trial in Judge Noel's 
22 | court, in which he is a defendant. 
23 All I'm asking is that if we do go ahead today, 
24 that I be given an opportunity to present whatever rebutta 
25 may be necessary from him at a later date. And with 
4 
19 
20 
21 
1 respect to the fact that has been represented by defendant, 
2 that is true. I did speak with him last week. I spoke 
3 with Mr. Spicer and he had every intention of coming 
4 when I spoke to him. 
5 When he called me yesterday morning, this is 
6 something that apparently flared up again over the weekend, 
7 and he was not aware in time to get any kind of alternative 
3 transportation and get here. 
9 THE COURT: Where is he? 
I0 MR. WELLS: In Florida. 
H THE COURT: Oh, Florida. The motion for 
12 a continuance will be denied. The motion — the other 
.* motions will be taken under advisement. 
I4 MR. WELLS: Thank you. 
jc THE COURT: We can proceed. 
13 There is in the file a confusing pleading. 
j7 I think maybe this was your secretary, Mr. Wells, who 
18 m aY have typed the wrong caption on the case and it has 
19 gotten in the wrong file as a result. But I don't see 
what it has to do — 
MR. WELLS: This is the other matter, 
and I think that's what happened. We had two files in 
23 I the office, and my gal got the wrong heading on it. 
24 THE COURT: That shouldn't be in there. 
25 MR. WELLS: That should be in the other 
5 
20 
21 
22 
1 filer and unfortunatelyr I don't have that number with 
2 me. But I can get it. 
3 THE COURT: I'll just ignore it for right 
4 nowr and after this is over we111 put the right heading 
5 on it and get it into the right file. But for right 
6 nowf I will just presume it is meaningless in this case. 
7 All right. Let's get started. 
8 MR. WELLS: May I inquire as to how we 
9 should proceed. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Wells, you are the plaintiff, 
11 I MR. WELLS: I'm going to call your client 
12 as a witness and go to work. 
13 MR. WRAY: May I have just a moment with 
14 ! ray clientr Your Honor. 
15 | THE COURT: Yes. 
lg ' (The following proceedings were held in open 
17 I court) 
18 THE COURT: The matter before the court 
19 this morning is Jerry Spicer vs. Michael Hughes, C87-
20 7595. Is the plaintiff ready to proceed? 
21 MR. WELLS: We are ready, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Is the defendant ready to 
23 proceed? 
24 MR. WARY: Thank you, Your Honor. We 
25 are. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Wells, you can proceed. 
MR. WELLS: Thank you. Your Honor. I 
have just a very brief opening statement. 
THE COURT: That will be helpful. Thank 
you. 
MR. WELLS: This matter, Your Honor, is 
really quite a simple matter. The evidence will show 
that in approximately October of 1986 that the defendant 
was a registered stockbroker and acting as such, and 
that in that capacity he effected a transaction in the 
State of Texas, which because of certain regulations 
relating to the registration of securities, needed to 
be rescinded. 
And that at that time he was under an obligation 
to repay a certain person in the State of Texas the sum 
of $11,221.80. And the evidence will show that he had 
asked plaintiff, Mr. Spicer, who was in Texas at the 
time, to make that payment on his behalf. That Mr. Spicer 
did in fact make that payment for him, and that since 
that date he has not repaid Mr. Spicer for the monies 
advanced on his behalf to solve the problem with the 
rescission in Texas. 
It will be the plaintiff's position, Your Honor, 
that there was an implied promise to repay that money. 
That even if that is not found under the theory of 
7 
\ quantum meruit, we are entitled to recover back from 
2 Mr, Hughes the amount of money advanced by Mr. Spicer 
3 on his behalf to take care of that problem. 
4 THE COURT: Do you wish to make a statement 
5 at this time, Mr. Wray? 
6 MR. WRAY: Thank you. Your Honor. I do, 
7 I agree with Mr. Wells that the matter before 
3 this court is quite simple. Mr. Wells, through his opening 
9 J statement, has indicated that the matter in controversy 
JQ | here is a contract matter. Consequently, his relief, 
11 | if any, would be a matter of law. He has, in his opening 
12 statement, indicated to the court that he would be pursuing 
13 
15 
a theory of quantum meruit, an action in equity, not 
14 well pleaded, and therefore precluded in this action, 
Likewise, the indications of counsel that the transaction 
jg | in question was a loan cannot be proven. In the simplest 
17 of contract terms there needs to be a meeting of minds. 
18 There will not be any testimony from defendant that there 
19 was in fact a meeting of minds in this matter. In fact, 
20 the testimony of defendant will be quite clear that that 
21 was not a loan, this was merely a repayment of an 
22 antecedent debt. 
23 With respect to the reason that the transaction 
24 occurred, it is totally irrelevant, from Mr. Wells1 
25 perspective, as to why the transaction occurred. Whether 
8 
1 there was a gentleman in Texas or anyone else is 
2 irrelevant. Mr. Wells has pleaded specifically in his 
3 opening argument and indicated there was a payment flowing 
4 from Mr. Spicer for the benefit of Mr. Hughes in the 
5 amount of $11f221.80. There will not be any evidence 
5 in this matter as to that specific amount. Consequently, 
7 Your Honor, the theory of quantum meruit is barred by 
8 his failing to raise it timely in the pleadings. And 
9 I'm confident that Mr. Wells will not be able to indicate 
IP a contract with a meeting of the minds for the repayment 
of $11,221.80, or any other amount. 
J2 I Thank you, 
13 THE COURT: Thank you. If you could proceed, 
Mr. Wells. 
15 j MR. WELLS: Thank you. We will call Mr, 
16 Michael Hughes, 
,7 | MICHAEL HUGHES 
j 8 ] having been duly sworn, was examined and testified on 
his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
11 
14 
19 
20 
21 
23 
BY MR. WELLS 
22 Q Would you state your full name for the 
record. 
24 A Michael Scott Hughes, 
25 Q And your address? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
1986? 
A 
Q 
by whom were ; 
A 
Q 
to October of 
in Texas with 
a repayment? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Texas who had 
A 
Q 
under an oblic 
4388 Emigration Canyon Road. 
How old are you? 
32. 
What is your profession? 
I'm a stockbroker. 
What was your profession in October of 
I was a stockbroker. 
Calling your attention to October of 1986, 
you employed at that time? 
Equity-One Corporation. 
Okay. And again calling your attention 
1986, did you at that time have a problem 
a rescission which required you to make 
Yes. 
And was the sum of that repayment $11,221.80? 
No. It was $11,000. 
Even? 
Yes. 
And this was apparently to persons in 
purchased stock from you? 
Yes, it was. 
And as a result of that problem you were 
jation to repay that money? 
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A 
to do it. 
Yes, I was. Not an obligation; I chose 
THE COURT: I beg your pardon? I didn't 
hear the last statement. 
THE WITNESS: I chose to do it. I wasn't 
under an obligation. I chose to do it. 
Q 
to make that 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
for you, you 
have you? 
A 
Q 
(By Mr. Wells) And you asked Mr. Spicer 
payment for you, didn't you? 
I certainly did. 
And he in fact made that payment for you? 
Yesr he did. 
And since the time that he made that payment 
have not repaid any of that money to him, 
Heavens no. 
I hand you what's been marked as plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. P-24, which is a letter that was shown to 
you in your deposition in this matter. I will ask you 
if you recognize that letter. 
A 
Q 
to you on or 
A 
Q 
Yes, I do. 
And was that letter in fact delivered 
about the date thereof? 
Yes, it was. 
And you made no response to either the 
law firm that sent the le t t e r or to Mr. Spicer with respect 
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BY MR. WRAY; 
Q 
that you res 
A 
Q 
THE 
Mr. 
COURT: Mr. Wray. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
Hughes, did you feel it was appropriate 
pond in writing to a demand from — 
No, 
At ; 
I did not. 
any time did you borrow money from 
Mr. Wells, this $11,000, at any time? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
you and Mr. 
A 
Your Honor. 
BY MR. WELLS 
Q 
did he not? 
A 
Q 
A 
From Mr. Wells? 
I'm 
No, 
Was 
Spicer 
No, 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
' 
sorry, Mr. Spicer. 
I did not. 
there ever any communication between 
about a loan of $11,000 or $11,228? 
there was not. 
WRAY: I have no further questions, 
COURT: Anything further, Mr. Wells? 
WELLS: Yes, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
He did make that payment on your behalf, 
He absolutely did. 
And 
You 
you asked him to make it? 
bet I did. 
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not in evidence any writing that shows, number one, that 
any of these transactions involved Mr. Spicer as the 
purchaser. And number two, that Mr. Spicer ever agreed 
in writing to stand good for any of these transactions. 
And that's the whole problem with this defense, Your 
Honor, is that it's all precluded by the statute of frauds. 
THE COURT: Well, let's let Mr. Wray proceed 
here. I want to ask you one more question before he 
does, Mr. Hughes. 
EXAMINATION BY THE COURT 
I know this is a long time ago, a couple 
of years, but as I understand the testimony, you called 
Mr. Spicer on the phone and asked him — or told him 
to pay this $11,000 for you; is that right? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Okay. Now, I know it's been a long time, 
but as near as you can recall, tell me what he said and 
what you said. 
Let me ask you this first: When was it, about? 
A October of '86. 
Q 1986. And it was a telephone call? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you call him or did he call you? 
A I called him at U.S.S.&T. In an office 
there. 
22 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q Was anyone else on the line? 
A Not at the time. 
Q Was there anyone else in your office or 
in his office that could have overheard part of the 
conversation? 
A There was someone on my phone. My partner, 
Jeff Vanos. 
Q He heard your half of it? 
A Yes, he did. He heard Jerry's half of 
it, too. He was on the telephone with us. 
Q Oh. 
A As a matter of fact, every conversation 
I had with Jerry Spicer, because of what had happened, 
I had Jeff Vanos listen to every single — 
THE COURT: Vanos? V-A-N-0-S. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q (By the Court) As near as you can remember, 
tell me what you said to him and what he said to you? 
A I said, "Jerry, I have to have something 
paid to the State of Texas, or to Mr. Zwerner, in order 
to preclude going to the State of Texas. It has to be 
done today. It's $11,000. And I need to get it done." 
And he said he would do it. 
Q Exactly what were his words? Do you remember 
what he said? 
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A He said he would do it. He would take 
care of it. "What's the address?" 
Q Okay. 
A And he sent a courier. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions 
on that particular conversation before he moves on, either 
of you? 
MR. WELLS: No. 
MR. WRAY: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WRAY: 
Q Do you know where Mr. Spicer was located 
at the time this conversation occurred? 
A I called him at U.S.S.&T., United States 
Savings & Trust. 
Q Do you know what city in Texas? 
A Dallas, Texas. 
Q So you phoned Mr. Spicer in the Dallas, 
Texas offices of U.S.S.&T? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know what the term alter-ego means? 
A I think I know what it is. 
MR. WELLS: I'll object to his opinion 
about that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, sustained. 
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Wray. 
MR. WRAY: All right. 
Q (By Mr. Wray) You testified as to the 
existence of a $10,000 finder's fee. 
A Yes. 
Q Has the finder's fee been paid? 
A No. 
Q Is it possible that the $11,000 transaction 
that we discussed previously was in fact payment for 
a finder's fee? 
MR. WELLS: I'm going to object to what 
is possible. 
THE COURT: Sustained. He's testifying 
that it hasn't been paid. 
MR. WRAY: Well, swell. 
Q (By Mr. Wray) Mr. Hughes, we have entered 
into evidence some documents indicating a transaction 
that occurred from the offices of U.S.S.&T to another 
office in the amount of $11,000. Can you tell us what 
that transaction was about? 
A I had a rescission in Texas that was paid 
by that transaction. 
Q Was it a loan? 
A No, it was not. 
MR. WELLS: I'm going to object to his 
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conclusions without a foundation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. He stated his 
understanding. 
Q (By Mr. Wray) Were there any — ever 
any terms for repayment of that $11r000? 
A No. 
Q By you or by anyone else? 
A By no one. There were no terms. There 
was no loan. 
Q Did Mr. Spicer make any other collection 
efforts? 
A No, he did not. 
Q Pardon me. 
A No, he did not. 
Q Was there ever any communication after 
that transaction about repayment? 
A 
there was none 
Q 
A 
28, 1987. 
Q 
or ten yearsr 
A 
Q 
Until I got the letter from Mr, Wellsf 
\. 
And that was approximately how long ago? 
I guess that was October. It was October 
Is that approximately a week or a year 
or how long ago? 
A year. 
So for a period of a year there is not 
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any communication about this transaction between you — 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
questions of 
recess before 
be in recess 
Absolutely not. 
Have you ever felt it was a loan? 
No. 
Do you feel today it's a loan? 
No. 
Did you feel at the time it was a loan? 
No. 
MR. WRAY: Your Honor, I have no further 
this witness. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wells: 
MR. WELLS: Yes, I do have a few. 
THE COURT: Maybe we'll take a five minutes 
you start your cross examination. We'll 
for about five minutes. 
(Morning recess) 
BY MR. WELLS: 
Q 
you asked Mr. 
was some need 
A 
Q 
THE COURT: Proceed, Mr. Wells. 
MR. WELLS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
It's true, is it not, that at the time 
Spicer to take care of this for you there 
to move quickly? 
Uh huh. (Indicating affirmative) 
You told him there was a time problem 
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and you 
Lake of 
was to 
a time 
L needed 
A 
Q 
to get the check there that day? 
Yes. 
And 
:
 getting a c 
have Mr 
A 
Q 
problem 
A 
Q 
I believe you ^  
Spicer 
so this was a way for you in 
heck delivered to Texas that 
. Spicer take care of it for you? 
Yes, 
And 
, it 
Yes, 
Now, 
besti 
as president 
it was. 
Salt 
day. 
you in fact told him that there was 
had to be done that day? 
I did. 
with respect to this finder s fee, 
.fied that you were introduced to Mr. 
. of CITRAM; is that correct? 
A I was introduced to him as Jerry Spicer. 
He ended up being the president of CITRAM. 
Q He is the president of CITRAM, and CITRAM 
was looking for a partner. 
A Yes, they were. 
Q And you were going to act on behalf of 
them to put them together with somebody that could merge 
with them? 
A Sort of the other way around. I represented 
the Gold Hold people and found CITRAM for them. 
Q So you were representing the other side 
of the deal and putting them together with CITRAM? 
A No. When they came to me I was representing 
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that I knew some of these people who were in fact looking 
for those merger opportunities. 
Q 
A 
them put one 
Q 
about? 
A 
Q 
you help me 
A 
Q 
partner for 
A 
Okay. 
They came to me, asked me if I could help 
i together, and I said yes. 
And when you say "they," who are you talking 
Jerry Spicer and Bill Windsor. 
And Mr. Spicer came to you and said, "can 
put together a merger for CITRAM"? 
Yes. 
And you said, "Yes, I can get a merger 
CITRAM"? 
No. I said, "I will try and find someone 
who could help him to — 
Q 
help CITRAM 
A 
Q 
together you 
A 
Q 
You were going to find somebody who would 
get a merger put together? 
Yes. 
And for your fees for putting that merger 
i were going to get a finder's fee? 
Yes, I was. 
And that finder's fee would be paid to 
you if the merger came about? 
A 
Q 
Yes, it was. 
And was to be paid to you for in fact 
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1 helping to bring the merger about? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q That was something CITRAM wanted you to 
4 do and something that the other corporation wanted you 
5 to do? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Were you going to get a finder1s fee from 
g each side? 
9 I A No, I was not. 
10 Q Which side of the deal was responsible 
11 for the finder's fee? 
12 A Jerry Spicer was. 
13 Q So that would have been the CITRAM side 
14 of the deal? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And so CITRAM was going to pay you a finder's 
17 fee if you could find a suitable merger partner? 
18 A Yes, that's correct. 
19 Q Now, did Mr. Spicer ever give you anything 
20 in writing that said that if CITRAM didn't pay that fee 
2i that he would pay it to you personally? 
22 A No, he did not. 
23 MR. WELLS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm 
24 going to move to strike all the testimony regarding the 
25 supposed finder's fee on the basis of the statute of 
46 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
frauds, because he has just testified that Mr. Spicer 
never agreed personally to assume that. He's testified 
that it was a finder's fee from CITRAM which was to be 
paid upon the completion of a successful merger. And 
apparently this merger came about and the fee is owed 
by CITRAM. But there is no evidence that Mr. Spicer 
in fact ever agreed to be personally responsible for 
that. 
THE COURT: Overruled. I think even if 
it's not legally collectible it goes to the issue of 
what the $11,000 transaction was all about, and therefore, 
the motion to strike will be denied. 
MR. WELLS: Well, Your Honor, the statute 
does say that it cannot be used as a defense. 
THE COURT: I understand that. But in 
this particular instance it's not being used as a setoff, 
it is being used to explain the purpose of the $11,000 
transaction, and the motion is denied. 
Anything further. 
MR. WELLS: Yes, Your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Wells) Now, you have previously 
testified regarding the telephone conversation. 
A Yes. 
Q Is there anything else you can remember 
about that conversation that you haven't told us? 
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1 A Which conversation are we talking about? 
2 Q The one where you called Mr. Spicer and 
3 asked him to deliver this money. 
4 A No, there wasn't. 
5 Q There's nothing else? 
6 A That is the gist of the conversation. 
7 Q There's nothing else about that conversation 
8 I that you can recall, that you haven't told us? 
9 A No. That's it. 
10 MR. WELLS: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
H I THE COURT: Anything further. 
12 MR. WRAY: Just one further question. 
13 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
14 3Y MR. WRAY: 
15 Q Mr. Hughes, does U.S.S.&T owe you money? 
16 A Yes, they do. 
17 MR. WRAY: Thank you. 
18 MR. WELLS: Your Honor, again, I'm going 
19 to — well, strike that, I can cover that on cross. 
20 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. WELLS: 
22 Q You claim that U.S.S.&G owes you money? 
23 A U.S.S.&T. 
24 Q U.S.S.&T. 
25 A Yes. United States Savings & Trust. 
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Q That's a corporation. 
A Yes, it is. 
Q Have you ever received from Mr. Spicer 
anything in writing wherein he agreed to personally pay 
any debts owed to you by that corporation? 
A No. Of course not. 
MR. WELLS: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wray, anything further. 
MR. WRAY: Your Honor, I have nothing 
further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Do you 
have any more witnesses, Mr. Wray? 
MR. WRAY: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any rebuttal witnesses. 
MR. WELLS: Yes, Your Honor. I believe 
that would be appropriate, and we do have some rebuttal 
testimony from Mr. Spicer. 
And as I indicated to the court earlier, because 
of his health problems he is unable to be here. I would 
move that the court allow the case to remain open to 
a later date when we can have Mr. Spicer appear and testify. 
THE COURT: That motion was taken under 
advisement earlier. After having heard the testimony, 
I think my inclination is to deny that motion. 
This matter was continued once. Mr. Spicer 
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1 did have an opportunity to be here, and I think today 
2 is the day set for trial. I would anticipate that if 
3 he were here he would say that he had a different under-
4 standing than Mr. Hughes, and there may be some differences 
5 in his testimony, but I don't think that the nature of 
6 the case is such that it would be unfair to not allow 
7 him to testify. And based upon that, the motion is denied. 
8 Do you have a closing statement to make, Mr. 
9 Wells? 
JO MR* WELLS: Yes, Your Honor. Before I 
11 do that, though, I would once again move to strike all 
12 of the testimony of Mr. Hughes relating to monies owed 
13 to him by CITRAM as a finder's fee and by U.S.S.&T for 
14 whatever reason on the grounds that those debts are not 
15 material to the issues of this lawsuit. They are not 
16 relevant to the issues of this lawsuit. And the question 
17 before the court is whether or not Mr. Jerry Spicer had 
18 an antecedent debt personally owing to the defendant 
19 which could have been used as an offset for the amounts 
20 loaned and advanced on his behalf by Mr. Spicer and as 
21 shown by the testimony. 
22 T k e statute of frauds precludes any consideration 
23 by the court of debts owing to Mr. Hughes by either of 
24 the corporations because of the fact that there is no 
25 evidence of a writing, as required by the statute of 
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1 frauds. And so I would therefore move the court that 
2 all of the testimony relating to debts owed to the 
3 defendant by any corporate entity be stricken at this 
4 time. 
5 THE COURT: I will take that under advisement 
6 for a few moments. I will let you continue with your 
7 closing argument. 
8 MR. WELLS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
9 I As I indicated. Your Honor, this is a relatively 
10 simple case. If the court will recall the testimony, 
H and specifically when the court was inquiring of Mr. 
12 Hughes with respect to the conversation he had with Mr. 
13 Spicer at the time that he needed this money paid in 
14 Texas, he testified that he called and ask Jerry if he 
15 would pay that money for him, and Jerry said yes. 
16 I think it is very — I guess telling is a 
17 good word that with respect to the claim of the defendant 
18 he did not claim that in that conversation he said to 
19 Jerry, you can take care of the monies you owe me, or 
20 this will take care of the finder's fee, or this will 
21 take care of anything else. 
22 He said nothing in that conversation which 
23 would have indicated to Mr. Spicer that he was asking 
24 him to repay an amount previously owed to him. 
25 If you will recall, he testified that he called 
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1 would be obligated to repay. 
2 Thank-you, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. You may have the 
4 last word if you want, Mr. Wells. 
5 MR. WELLS: Thank you, Your Honor. Counsel 
6 now tries to raise, I guess you would say, a specter 
7 before the court with respect to the fact that Mr. Spicer 
8 isn't here, that he's unavailable. I don't think that 
9 it's proper for him to get up and" say, you know, we should 
10 have had Mr. Spicer here. If he wanted Mr. Spicer here 
11 he could have agreed to the continuance. 
12 Now, the court is well aware that in law a 
13 loan'agreement as such is not necessary. You can have 
14 I a loan without having a signed loan agreement. All you 
15 have to do is pass the money. The law will imply that 
16 this is a loan unless there is testimony that would show 
17 that the parties agreed to some other disposition other 
18 than it being treated as a loan. 
19 Now, Mr. — 
20 THE COURT: I'm not familiar with that 
2i principle of law. Is there a case or something that 
22 you've got that says that the law implies a loan? 
23 MR. WELLS: The law would imply a contract 
24 to repay. There are cases to that effect, Your Honor, 
25 that when money passes, the law implies an obligation 
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1 to repay the money. When a benefit is conferred, the 
2 law implies a duty to compensate the person who gave 
3 the benefit. In this case the benefit was received, 
4 and he admits it. Mr. Spicer took care of a personal 
5 obligation that he had in the State of Texas. 
6 THE COURT: I would like to see one of 
7 those cases. You're saying that if you say, "Give me 
8 $25r" and I say okay and I give it to you, and nothing 
9 more is said, there is a presumption that that was a 
j 0 loan? You're saying that's the law. 
11 MR. WELLS: Well, I think I would state 
12 it perhaps a little differently than that. Your Honor. 
U Where there is no circumstance that would presume a gift. 
14 And when I confer a benefit to you, such as if you would 
15 say I have got to pay this light bill today or they are 
15 going to shut off my power, and then I go and pay your 
17 light bill for you, the law implies a duty on you to 
18 reimburse me for that payment. 
19 THE COURT: I would like to see a case 
20 like that. 
21 MR. WELLS: Now, in the event — that's 
22 basically what happened here. Mr. Hughes had an obligation 
23 in Texas that day. 
24 THE COURT: All right. 
25 MR. WELLS: And he calls Mr. Spicer and 
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said, "I have got to get this money to this attorney 
today. Can you help me out with that?" Mr. Spicer says 
yes, and Mr. Spicer then takes a personal check over 
and handles the problem for Mr. Hughes. 
THE COURT: Right. I think that's 
essentially what happened. 
MR. WELLS: It's our position that the 
law therefore implies a duty to repay Mr. Hughes that 
money. 
Now, again, Mr. Spicer isn't here and we don't 
have his side of what was said. But even without that 
I think the law gives us that implication. 
Now, we have that implication in place, and 
let's just assume for the sake of argument, that we now 
have shown the loan either through the evidence or implied 
in law. The duty, then, of the defendant, and before 
he can come into court and make a valid claim that- he 
does not owe the money, he would have to show that the 
circumstances were such that it was not a loan. The 
only way to do that is to show that it was a gift. 
He did not testify that it was a gift. He 
testified only that he asked Jerry to take care of a 
pressing obligation, that he had to have the money to 
Texas that day. There is no evidence from which the 
court could find there was a gift. 
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